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Abstract:
We investigate behavior in a laboratory public good experiment with unique endowment schemes
that allow a wider range of contribution strategies than in standard voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM) experiments. A baseline treatment follows a standard VCM design (subjects receive 10
tokens in each of 10 rounds that may be allocated between a private account and a group account). In
a new carry-over treatment, any tokens not allocated to the group account in the current period are
made available for contributions in future periods. Under full endowment, subjects receive 100
tokens in round one (rather than 10 tokens per round for each of 10 rounds). In the pledge treatment,
subjects’ allocation decisions for an initial endowment of 100 tokens may be changed in any round
and are binding only for the final round. We find that the size of the effective endowment and
whether contributions are binding significantly impact subject decision making. Deviations from the
free riding outcome are greater when subjects have a larger portion of their total endowment earlier
in the experiment, and subjects contribute less when their contribution decisions are binding.

JEL classification: C72; C90; H41
Keywords: Experiments; Public Goods; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
The voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM) is frequently used to investigate
collective action in a public goods
environment.
Rational choice theory
predicts that subjects won't contribute to the
public good account, instead choosing to
free-ride on the contributions of others

(Olsen, 1965). Evidence from experimental
VCM games finds the converse: subjects
typically allocate a nonzero amount to the
public good account, although these
contributions tend to decay over time. 1 Prior
1

For surveys of the literature, see Davis & Holt
(1993), Ledyard (1995), Offerman (1997), Ostrom
(2000), and Holt (2007).
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research has identified several determinants
of contribution levels in the VCM setting,
including the marginal per capita return
(MPCR) from the group account 2 and the
size of endowment, 3 with an increase in
either factor generating higher contribution
levels. Punishment/sanctioning mechanism4
or the presence of pre-play communication5
have also been found to raise contribution
levels.
Behavioral explanations for
deviations from the rational choice
prediction are commonplace, focused on
issues including altruism, social norms,
other regarding preferences, confusion, and
inequality aversion.
Despite the broad attention given to the
VCM framework, limited research has been
conducted to evaluate the impact of
endowment effects on subject behavior in
this setting (notable exceptions focus on
endowment heterogeneity 6 and endowment
2

For instance, see Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac et
al. (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988a), Isaac et al.
(1994), Fisher et al (1995), Dickinson (1998), Laury
et al. (1999), Goeree et al. (2002), and Cadigan et al.
(2011).
3
For instance, see Rapoport (1988), Van Dijk &
Grodska (1992), Chan et al. (1999), Clark (2002),
Cherry et al. (2005), Buckley & Croson (2006),
Hofmeyr et al. (2007), De Cremer & Van Dijk
(2009), Muehlbacher & Kirchler (2009), and
Spraggon & Oxoby (2009).
4
For instance, see Ostrom et al. (1992), Dickinson
and Isaac (1998), Fehr and Gächter (2000),
Dickinson (2001), Masclet et al. (2003), Walker &
Halloran (2004), Egas and Riedl (2005),
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Page et al. (2005),
Anderson & Putterman (2006), Bochet et al. (2006),
Gurerk et al. (2006), Carpenter (2007), Sefton et al.
(2007),
Ones
and
Putterman
(2007),
Nikiforakis(2008), Nikiforakis & Normann (2008),
and Ertan et al. (2009).
5
For instance, see Dawes et al. (1977), Isaac and
Walker (1988b), Palfrey & Rosenthal (1991), Ostrom
et al. (1992), Sally (1995), Wilson & Sell (1997),
Brosig et al. (2003), Rege & Telle (2004), Bochet et
al. (2006), and Chaudhuri (2006).
6
For instance, see Rapoport (1988), Van Dijk &
Grodska (1992), Chan et al. (1999), Cherry et al.
(2005), Buckley & Croson (2006), Hofmeyr et al.
(2007), De Cremer & Van Dijk (2009).

Page 2 of 17

origin 7 ).
Standard laboratory VCM
experiments parcel out the total endowment
in fixed intervals, a structure that constrains
the timing and magnitude of contributions in
a way that may influence the level of
collective action that is observed. In the
fixed interval framework, contribution
decisions made in early rounds are
binding—tokens allocated to the public
account cannot be taken back and tokens
allocated to the private account cannot be
invested in the public account in a later
period. Yet in practice, fundraising ventures
for public goods frequently rely on
“pledges” that provide potential information
on other donors’ willingness to contribute
but that are not binding. Allocating the
endowment in fixed intervals also limits the
ability of conditional cooperators to
reciprocate others contributions because
funds contributed to a private account
(perhaps early in a session while a subject
waits to see if there is cooperation) are not
available for future contributions. Similarly,
to the extent that early contributions foster
cooperative play, parceling endowments in
fixed intervals limits the ability of subjects
to signal a willingness to cooperate because
they do not have access to the entire
endowment. The primary purpose of this
paper is to examine the impact of different
endowment distribution schemes on the
contribution decisions of subjects in a public
goods game setting.
We use a total of four treatments—baseline,
full endowment, carryover and pledge—
described in detail below. In brief, our
results suggest that the endowment scheme
and ability to make non-binding pledges has
a substantive impact on subject decision
making. Relative to the baseline treatment,
the non-binding rounds of the pledge
treatment had higher contributions, but when
7

For instance, see Clark (2002), Cherry et al. (2005),
Muehlbacher & Kirchler (2009), Spraggon & Oxoby
(2009).
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the decision was binding contributions were
significantly lower. In the carryover and full
endowment treatments, the higher effective
endowment (relative to the baseline) appears
to have played a substantive role in the
evolution of subject contributions to the
group account. In the carryover treatment,
the effective endowment increased as rounds
progressed, and this served to increase
contributions to the group account early in
the experiment. By contrast, in the full
endowment
treatment
the
effective
endowment was decreased in each period by
the amount contributed to the group account.
In this treatment, contributions to the group
account also declined. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows: section two
details the experimental design and our
behavioral hypotheses, section 3 outlines our
procedures and experimental results, and
section 4 concludes.
2. EXPERIMENTAL
PROCEDURE

DESIGN

AND

In the basic VCM game, subjects in groups
of size n are endowed with a number of
tokens that may be allocated to a group
account or a private account. Each subject’s
marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the
group account is lower than that available
from the private account, but the group
account return accrues to all members of the
group irrespective of their contribution
decisions. For this specification the Nash
equilibrium prediction has each subject
allocate zero tokens to the group account,
producing the common free-riding dilemma
because the socially efficient outcome has
each subject allocate all tokens to the group
account. The presence of multiple periods
(i.e. repeated stage games) does not change
either the Nash prediction or the socially
efficient contribution scheme. Our VCM
framework follows the standard design, with
the exception of altering some aspects of the
endowment allocation. In every treatment,
subjects were randomly and anonymously
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placed into groups of four subjects. In each
of 10 periods the MPCR from the private
account and the group account were
constant: subjects received 1 experimental
dollar (ED) for each token they allocated to
the private account and ½ ED for each token
allocated to the group account. Importantly,
each member of the group received the ½
ED return for each token allocated to the
group account, irrespective of their
contribution decision. At the end of each
period, subjects were shown a screen that
displayed their contribution to the group
account, the total number of tokens allocated
to the group account, and their period payoff
in ED. At the end of the experimental
session, the EDs were exchanged for real
dollar compensation at a rate of $0.10 per 1
ED. The total endowment (100 tokens)
remained fixed across all treatments,
although the distribution scheme varied.
Despite the alternative distribution schemes
(described below) the Nash equilibrium
prediction and socially efficient outcome
remain the same across treatments. Each
subject earns 100 ED at the Nash
equilibrium and 200 ED using the socially
optimal contribution scheme.
2.1. Baseline
In the baseline treatment, subjects were
endowed with 10 experimental tokens ( )
at the beginning of every period. The
effective per-period endowment to a subject
in period t (
) of the baseline can be
expressed as:

In
each
period,
subjects
decided
independently and simultaneously how to
allocate these tokens between the group
account (
) and the private account
(
). At the end of each round,
subjects were informed of their contribution
to the group account as well as the total
contribution to the group account (
).
Per-token-returns from the private account

Copyright © 2017, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.
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of 1 ED and from the group account of ½
ED results in the following per-periodearnings formula for each subject (expressed
in ED):
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where ^ indicates that the variable represents
a total (e.g. total profits, total endowment,
total subject contribution to the group
account, and total group contribution to the
group account).
2.3. Full Endowment

2.2. Carryover
In the carryover treatment, subjects also
received 10 experimental tokens each
period. Each subject then decided how to
allocate these tokens between the group
account
and
the
private
account.
Importantly, any tokens allocated to the
private account were available for
reallocation to the group account in all
subsequent periods.
As a result, the
effective endowment for a subject in all
periods beyond period 1 consisted of 10
tokens as well as all tokens currently
allocated to the private account. In this way,
the precise per-period endowment to
subjects varied according to past allocation
decisions, with effective endowment in
period t expressed as:

where
represents the
sum of contributions to the private account
in all previous periods. Note, this formula
only applies to effective endowment for t >
1; the first period endowment is 10 tokens.
While no per-period-earnings formula for
subjects in this treatment is available since
tokens allocated to the private account could
always reallocated to the group account in a
future period, the per-period earnings
equation can be reinterpreted as a total
earnings equation expressed as follows:

In the full endowment treatment, subjects
receive 100 tokens at the beginning of the
first period, with no further endowment
distributions.
In each period, subjects
decided how many tokens to allocate
between the group account and the private
account. As in the carryover treatment, any
tokens allocated to the private account were
available for reallocation to the group
account in every subsequent period. As a
result, the effective per-period endowment
in period t depended on the past allocation
decisions in periods 1 to t-1. Accordingly,
one can express the effective endowment in
period t as:

where
is equal to the lump-sum
endowment in period 1 and
represents the sum of contributions to the
group account by subject i in all preceding
periods. Again, because of the design of this
treatment, it is not possible to construct a
per-period earnings equation. Instead, refer
to the total earnings equation derived in the
carryover treatment.
2.4. Pledge
In the pledge treatment, subjects received
100 tokens in the first period with no further
endowment distributions. At the beginning
of each period, subjects allocated tokens
between the group account and the private
account. Any tokens allocated to the private
account could be reallocated to the group in
the following periods.
Additionally,
subjects were given the option at the end of

Copyright © 2017, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.
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each period to reallocate tokens from the
group account to the private account. Thus,
the initial contribution to the group account
by subject i represents a pledge, which can
later be reneged. Since subjects could freely
reallocate tokens between the group account
and the private account in all rounds, the
effective endowment of each subject in
period t can be expressed simply as:

As such, only the allocation after the last
round mattered in the determination of
subject earnings, which can be similarly
defined according to the total earnings
equation derived earlier.
2.5. Behavioral hypotheses
Given the decay in contributions typically
observed in VCM games, we expect
endowment distribution schemes which
provide subjects with the greatest
opportunity to contribute early in an
experimental session to have the highest
contribution levels and, therefore, the
greatest economic efficiency.
The
opportunity for contribution consists of two
aspects: whether subject allocation decisions
are binding and whether the effective
endowment to subjects at a given point in
the game is relatively large or small. Nonbinding allocations decisions are those
decisions that don't affect earnings
outcomes. Because these decisions provide
subjects with the chance to learn about the
game without affecting final earnings, and
because contributions have been observed to
decay in prior research (as referenced in the
introduction), we expect lower contributions
in treatments where binding decisions occur
in later rounds of the session. Non-binding
allocation decisions may also be used
strategically in the sense that subjects may
try to engender cooperation by contributing
in the non-binding rounds only to free ride
when the decisions count. The size of the
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effective endowment also affects subject
contributions. In particular, a relatively
large effective endowment provided early in
an experimental session may lead to
increased contributions.
Following this
behavioral intuition, the baseline, carryover,
and full endowment treatments should
produce higher levels of contributions to the
group account than the pledge treatment.
While allocations to the public account are
binding in the baseline, carryover, and full
endowment treatments in every round, only
the allocation decision in the final round is
binding for the pledge treatment. Since
earlier allocation decisions are not binding,
subjects are free to learn about the
intricacies of the treatment or to strategically
signal cooperative intent without any costs.
At the tenth period, we expect subjects will
have learned the individually payoff
maximizing strategy and will implement it.
Ultimately, given that overall contributions
to the group account depend solely on the
allocation decisions in the final round when
subjects are likely to contribute little to the
group account, the pledge treatment should
lead to the lowest level of efficiency.
Of the fully-binding treatments, we expect
the full endowment treatment to produce the
greatest overall level of contribution and
economic efficiency. Unlike the baseline
and carryover treatments, subjects are
endowed with the full 100 tokens in the very
first period, when they are the most
inexperienced with the game. Therefore, the
full endowment distribution scheme
provides substantial opportunity for subjects
to over-contribute to the group account,
especially in the early periods when subjects
have not experienced others free riding
behavior and contribution decay. In contrast,
the opportunity for subjects in the baseline
and carryover treatments to over-contribute
to the group account is consistently limited
by their per-period endowment of 10 tokens.
In effective endowment terms, the effective
endowment in the full endowment treatment

Copyright © 2017, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.
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is greater than the effective endowments in
either the baseline or the carryover
treatments, particularly in earlier periods.
Accordingly, the full endowment treatment
should produce the highest contribution
level and efficiency. Finally, the carryover
treatment has a higher effective endowment
than the baseline, which should lead to
higher relative contributions and efficiency.
In the carryover treatment, allocations to the
private account in previous periods can be
used for the group account in future periods,
thereby increasing the effective endowment
to subjects in every period following the
first period. Thus, the effective endowment
in each period of the carryover treatment is
greater than or equal to that of the baseline,
even though the total endowment remains
fixed across treatment. As a result, we
expect subject contribution to the group
account to be higher in the carryover
treatment than in the baseline.
In sum, considering whether allocations
decisions are binding as well as the size of
effective endowments, our behavioral
expectations are as follows: the full
endowment treatment generates the greatest
contributions to the group account, the
pledge treatment produces the lowest level,
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and the carryover treatment leads to a
greater level of overall contributions than
the baseline.
3. EXPERIMENTAL
AND RESULTS

PROCEDURES

3.1 Procedures
Subjects for the experiment were recruited
by email from the student body at
Gettysburg College. A total of one hundred
and thirty-six subjects participated in nine
sessions across four treatments. Sessions
were conducted in the Gettysburg Lab for
Experimental Economics and used the ZTree
software
(Fischbacher,
2007).
Instructions for the experiment are provided
in Appendix A. Upon conclusion of the
experimental session,
subjects were
individually called to receive compensation
privately. Experimental sessions typically
lasted 45 minutes, including time spent
reading instructions. Participant compensation ranged from $5.85-$21.75, with an
average compensation of $14.98.
The
number of subjects per treatment and the
average compensation per treatment can be
found in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Treatments
Treatment
Baseline
Carryover
Full Endowment
Pledge

Number of subjects
28
40
36
32

3.2 Total Contributions
Our analysis of the experimental results
begins with total contribution percentages
by treatment. In each treatment, subjects
were endowed with a total of 100 tokens.
We define the total contribution as the
number of the 100 token endowment
contributed to the public account over the

Average compensation
$14.83
$15.89
$15.26
$13.64

course of the experiment.
With the
exception of the pledge treatment, the total
contribution is the sum of contributions
across the 10 periods.
Because
contributions were not binding in periods 19 for the Pledge treatment, we use the total
contribution to the group account as
determined after period 10.
For each

Copyright © 2017, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.
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treatment, Figure 1 presents a cumulative
frequency distribution with the percentage
of subjects on the vertical axis and total
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contributions to the group account as a
percentage on the horizontal axis.

Figure 1. Actual Contribution Frequencies by Amount
1

Number of Subjects (%)

0,8

0,6

Baseline
Carryover
0,4

FullEndowment
Pledge

0,2

0
0

0,2

0,4
0,6
Total Contribution (%)

The pledge treatment possesses the largest
percentage of subjects to contribute zero
tokens to the group account (exactly 25%).
Furthermore, with approximately 60% of
subjects contributing less than 25% of
endowment, the pledge treatment produced
the results closest to the Nash equilibrium
prediction. Note also that the cumulative
distributions for the carryover and full
endowment treatments indicate greater
contributions, with roughly 80% of subjects
contributing 90% or less of total endowment
for both treatments. In contrast, the pledge
and baseline treatments had 80% of subjects
contributing 75% and 65% or less of the

0,8

1

total
endowment,
respectively.
The
carryover treatment in particular appears to
have had higher contributions as evidenced
by its consistent position furthest to the right
side of the chart. Interestingly, the effect of
the carryover and full endowment treatments
appears most prevalent on the upper 50% of
the total contribution distribution, at which
point both actual frequencies diverge
substantially from the baseline treatment.
To test whether differences across
treatments are statistically significant, we
utilize a Wilcoxon rank-sum test on total
contributions. The results are shown in
Table 2.
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Table 2. Treatment Contribution
Comparisons (Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test)
Treatment Combination
Baseline/Carryover
Baseline/Full
Baseline/Pledge
Carryover/Full
Carryover/Pledge
Full/Pledge
Consistent
with
our
expectations,
differences between the pledge and other
treatments are significant at the 10% level or
better. While the carryover treatment had
the highest total contributions, differences
between the carryover and baseline
treatment are at best marginally significant.
Overall, both the ordering of the actual
distributions and the statistical results are
consistent with the behavioral predictions:
contributions increased in the baseline
treatment relative to the pledge treatment as
well as in the full endowment and carryover
treatments relative to the baseline treatment,
although the magnitude of the increase was
not always sufficient to be deemed
statistically significant.

Prob > |z|
0.16
0.56
0.10
0.44
0.01
0.07

In addition to predicting that the
different treatments would affect total
contributions differently, the behavioral
hypotheses developed earlier also predicted
that each treatment would uniquely affect
economic efficiency.
Define a total
efficiency index for treatment s with n
subjects indexed by i as:

The efficiency calculations for
treatment are provided in Table 3.

each

Table 3. Efficiency Results
Treatment
Efficiency
Baseline
48.32%
Carryover
58.85%
Full Endowment
52.64%
Pledge
36.44%
This efficiency index characterizes the
average level of total contribution for each
treatment. In this way, the Nash equilibrium
of zero contributions to the group account
corresponds to an efficiency of 0% while the
socially efficient equilibrium of contribute
all corresponds to an efficiency of 100%.

3.3 Per-Period Contributions
In addition to the analysis of aggregate
contributions provided above, we are
interested in the distribution of contributions
by period. Our endowment schemes provide
a wide range of potential contributions, and
as such we investigate both the level of

Copyright © 2017, Archives of Psychology. All rights reserved.
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contributions and the percent of the effective
endowment contributed. Figure 2 depicts
the average per-period contribution (in
level) to the group account across treatment
and period. The pledge treatment is
excluded from the figure because of
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substantial volatility in per-period, absolute
contributions, a consequence of the nonbinding nature of allocation decisions that
obfuscates any meaningful comparison
between the pledge treatment and the other
treatments on a round-by-round basis.

Figure 2. Average Absolute Contribution (by Period and Treatment)
9
Absolute Contribution

8
7
6
5

Baseline

4

Carryover

3

Full Endowment

2

1
0

0

2

4

6
Period

Contributions in the baseline treatment are
consistent with those observed in the
literature for VCM experiments using
similarly sized groups and MPCR levels,
and show decay from around 50% of the
endowment in early rounds to about around
30% in the final period. While the level of
contributions also fell in the full endowment
treatment, contributions in the carryover
treatment remained fairly constant, moving
between 5 and 7 tokens per period. It is
important to keep in mind that while the
level of contributions was relatively
constant, the effective endowment was
increasing.
For example, a subject
contributing 5 tokens in the first period (out
of the 10 token endowment) would see their
second period endowment increase to 15. A
second period contribution of 5 would then
lead to a third period endowment of 20. It
may be that the increase in endowment
served as a focal point for subjects,
preventing the decay typically observed in

8

10

public goods experiments. Note also that
the level of contributions was decreasing for
the full endowment treatment. In this case
the effective endowment was falling in
every period by the amount contributed to
the group account. As was the case for the
carryover treatment, this may have served as
a focal point—as the endowment decreased,
subjects reduced contributions to the group
account.
Figure 3 displays the average, relative
contribution to the group account across
treatment and period. Relative contribution
(
) for subject i in period t of treatment s
is defined as:

where
represents the contribution to the
group account and
represents the
effective endowment, calculated for each
treatment previously.
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Figure 3. Average Relative Contribution (by Period and Treatment)
0,7

Relative Contribution

0,6
0,5
0,4

Baseline

0,3

Carryover
Full Endowment

0,2

Pledge

0,1
0
0

2

4

6
Period

As a percentage of the effective endowment,
contributions to the group account decayed
in the baseline, carryover, and pledge
treatments.
Importantly, the decay in
contributions for the pledge did not occur
until the final period—at which point the
contribution was binding and very close to
the final relative contribution from the
baseline. As shown earlier, the efficiency of
the pledge treatment was low relative to that
in the baseline. While subject contributions
to the group account were binding in the
baseline, they appear to have been used
strategically in the pledge, with subjects
increasing their relative contributions right
up to the point that it mattered. Thus, the
binding nature of early contributions in the
baseline
led
to
higher
aggregate
contributions and efficiency.
With respect to the full endowment and
carryover treatments, relative contributions
were consistently lower than the baseline

Copyright 2017 KEI Journals. All Rights Reserved

8

10

treatment. While the level of contributions
in those treatments was higher, so was the
effective endowment.
For the full
endowment treatment, starting with the
entire 100 token endowment made the
relative contribution low—it remained
around 10% throughout the experiment. As
previously
described,
the
effective
endowment in the carryover treatment was
increasing as the experiment progressed and
tokens allocated to the private account were
made available for future use. This, even
though the level of contributions was
basically flat, the relative contribution was
decreasing.
In order to confirm the aggregate
interpretation of relative, per-period
contributions, a model of individual perperiod, decision-making is now developed.
Using random effects regression estimates,
the following contribution model is
estimated:
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where
is the relative contribution to the
group account by subject i in period t,
is
a vector of dummies controlling for
treatment (baseline is omitted condition),
is a vector for period,
is a vector of
interaction terms between period and
treatment,
is a vector of lagged
controls for past subject behavior, is a
dummy variable for the last period (all other
periods are omitted condition),
is an
interaction term between the pledge
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treatment and the final period dummy
variable, and
is the stochastic,
contemporaneous error term. To elaborate,
is a vector that consists of subject i's
relative contribution to the group account in
the previous period (
) and subject i's
deviation from the average, relative
contribution of her group in the previous
period (
).
All control
variables follow from prior research.8 The
regression results are given in Table 4.

Table 4. Random Effects Regression Results*
Independent Variable
Carryover
FullEndowment
Pledge
Period
Period*Carryover
Period*FullEndowment
Period*Pledge
LastPeriod
LastPeriod*Pledge
RelContLagged
RelContLaggedDeviate
Constant
R2 overall
Wald χ2
Prob > χ2
N
*Robust standard errors
8

Coefficient Estimate
(two-tailed p-values)
-0.0717749
(0.077)
-0.1147246
(0.001)
0.015186
(0.743)
-0.0101347
(0.046)
0.0075213
(0.226)
0.0150233
(0.019)
0.0086663
(0.248)
-0.0319348
(0.188)
-0.1736916
(0.003)
0.8852845
(0.000)
-0.1721071
(0.000)
.106315
(0.003)
0.6995
2821.65
0.0000
1224

In particular, see Dickinson (1998), Galbiati & Vertova (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), and Cadigan et al. (2011).
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The coefficient estimates on the full
endowment treatment variable, the period
variable, the interaction term between these
two variables, the lagged contribution
variable, the interaction term between
pledge and the last period, and the lagged
contribution deviate variable are all
statistically significant at the 0.05
significance level.
Furthermore, the
coefficient estimates on these variables are
in the correct direction. Of the treatment
dummies, only the full endowment variable
coefficient estimate was statistically
significant at the 0.05 significance level,
although the carryover estimate was very
close to being as well. The negative signs of
the coefficient estimates on the carryover
and treatment variables support the previous
interpretation of the per-period, relative
contributions trends. Also, the coefficient
estimate on the full endowment dummy is
the third most substantial, revealing the
importance of the full endowment treatment
in the per-period relative contribution
decision of individuals. The coefficient
estimate on the interaction term between
period and full endowment indicates that
relative contributions in the full endowment
treatment increased each period, relative to
the baseline. These results lend credence to
the upward sloping trend of relative
contributions in the full endowment
treatment observed earlier. The entire effect
of the full endowment treatment on relative
contribution is characterized by the joint
effect of its dummy variable and its
interaction term, itself a function of period.
This interpretation applies to all treatment
variables.
The statistical significance and sign of the
coefficient estimate on period reveals that
subjects' relative contribution to the group
account exhibited decay over time, an
observation
consistently
substantiated.
These results suggest that subject behavior
does converge toward the Nash equilibrium
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outcome where all subjects contribute 0
tokens to the group account in all periods.
Notably, the coefficient estimate on the
interaction term between the pledge
treatment dummy variable and the dummy
variable for the last period is statistically
significant in difference from zero at the
0.05 significance level. The sign of this
estimate supports the existence of a sharp
and distinct decline in subject contributions
in the final period of the pledge treatment, as
documented earlier, a result of subjects
learning to free-ride. This sharp decay is
also suggestive of subjects learning how to
free-ride most effectively; subjects appear to
actively attempt to deceive other players into
over-contributing to the group account.
Rising relative contributions in non-binding
rounds represents subjects signaling their
willingness to contribute to the group
account to their group members. However,
relative contributions decline sharply in the
final round, contrary to signaling in prior
rounds, as subjects renege on their initial
pledges. This behavior is entirely consistent
with the strategic framework of Nash
equilibrium in which subjects free-ride on
the contributions of others, although it does
also suggest that subjects actively attempt to
encourage other members to over-contribute
in addition to simply contributing zero
tokens to the group account. Notably,
however, all contributions do not collapse to
zero in the final round of the pledge
treatment, indicating that some subjects
maintain a willingness to cooperate and
contribute despite being given ample
opportunity to learn the incentive to free ride
on others’ contributions.
Lagged relative contribution to the group
account (
) influenced subject's
contribution
decision
significantly.
Intuitively, one would expect that a subject
that had contributed a large amount to the
group account in the previous period would
also contribute a lot to the group account in
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the current period. This relationship is
borne out with a coefficient estimate of
approximately 0.8853, easily the most
substantial factor in the contribution
decision.
Similarly, lagged relative
contribution deviation (
)
factored
both
substantially,
and
significantly, into the contribution decision.
With a coefficient estimate of roughly 0.1721, the intuition behind this estimate is
clear: if a subject contributed more to the
group account relative to the rest of the
group, she would respond by contributing
less in the subsequent period. Similarly, if a
subject contributed less to the group account
relative to the rest of the group, she would
respond by contributing more in the
following period.
4. Concluding Remarks
Our research evaluates the impact of
different endowment schemes on subject
decision making in a standard VCM
framework. Our treatments varied whether
a subject’s decision was binding and the
effective endowment available to subjects.
The treatments that had binding allocation
decisions and high effective endowment
were predicted to generate the greatest
overall levels of contribution. Evidence
from the lab supported these basic
behavioral predictions. Most notably, the
pledge treatment possessed the lowest level
of overall contribution, followed by the
baseline treatment and the full endowment,
respectively, with the carryover treatment
possessing the highest level of contribution.
Only the latter result (i.e. the carryover
treatment achieving greater contribution
than full endowment treatment) was
unexpected. This result may be linked to the
impact of increasing effective endowments
for the carryover and decreasing effective
endowments for the full endowment.
Testing differences between the frequency
distributions of total contribution for each
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treatment provided further support of the
behavioral hypotheses.
In addition to analyzing overall outcomes,
per-period,
absolute
and
relative
contribution trends for each treatment were
analyzed.
These results were largely
complementary to the primary, aggregate
analysis.
With respect to absolute
contributions, the carryover treatment and
full endowment treatment had the largest
absolute contribution levels while the
baseline treatment consistently had the
lowest. Concerning relative contributions,
the pledge and the baseline treatments
possessed the largest relative contributions,
while the carryover and full endowment
treatments had the lowest. Given that
relative contribution was a function of
absolute
contribution
and
effective
endowment, these results suggested that
absolute contributions rose less than onefor-one with increases in effective
endowment in the full endowment and
carryover treatments.
Finally, to reinforce the nonparametric
analysis, an individual model of relative
contribution
decision-making
was
developed. The coefficient estimates were
consistent with previous literature as well as
all analyses herein.
For instance, the
coefficient estimate on period was
statistically significant and negative,
indicating decay, while the coefficient
estimates on lagged relative contribution and
lagged relative deviation were positive and
negative, respectively, as well statistically
significant. Interestingly, the coefficient
estimates on the full endowment and
carryover treatment dummies were both
negative and either statistically significant or
very close to being so, results that agreed
with
the
nonparametric
analyses
summarized above. Future research could
investigate the carryover and full
endowment treatments in greater depth. In
contrast to the behavioral predictions, the
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carryover treatment generated greater total
contributions
and
greater
economic
efficiency than the full endowment
treatment, although these differences were
not statistically significant. A rationale for
this discrepancy may provide insight into the
endowment distribution schemes most
capable of achieving greater total
contributions and economic efficiency.
Additionally, the notion that economic
efficiency and total contributions may be
maximized by imposing mechanisms that
take advantage of subject unfamiliarity is
worth further consideration.
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APPENDIX
Instructions (Baseline)9
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and
make good decisions you might earn a fair amount of money that will be paid to you privately and in cash at
the end of today's session. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other
participants make. You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions
private do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
The Experiment
For this experiment you will be placed in a group of four people (you plus three other people). We have
already randomly assigned you to a group. You will remain in this group for the duration of the
experiment. However, you will not be told each other’s identities. Your earnings will depend upon the
decisions that you make and the decisions that the other people in your group make.
The experiment will consist of ten rounds.
At the beginning of round one, each person in the group will be endowed with 10 tokens. You must choose
how many of these tokens to keep in your private account and how many tokens to allocate to a group
account. The amount of money that you earn in each decision round depends on how many tokens you have in
your private account, how many tokens you allocate to the group account, and how many tokens the others in
your group allocate to the group account.
You will earn 10 cents for each token you have in your private account. Your will earn 5 cents for each token
you have allocated to the group account, plus 5 cents from each token allocated to the group account by the
other persons in your group.
To summarize, in each round you will earn:
$0.10 times the number of tokens you have in your private account +
$0.05 times the total number of tokens allocated to the group account by your group
After you have made your decision for the round, please wait while the others in your group finish making
their decisions. At the end of each round, there will be a summary screen that allows you to see how many
tokens were allocated to the group account, as well as your personal earnings. You will not be able to see
which individuals allocated tokens to the group account, or how much a specific individual allocated.
The same process will be repeated for all ten rounds. At the conclusion of all ten rounds, each participant’s
earnings will be totaled and shown privately.
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. Otherwise, please press the "Continue" button at
the bottom right of your screen.

9

Instructions for other treatments available upon request.
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